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What	Carillion’s	collapse	tells	us	about	public	sector
outsourcing
Simon	Wren-Lewis	reflects	on	the	collapse	of	the	construction	firm	Carillion	and	on	the	problems	that
have	ensued	for	the	government.	Weighing	the	pros	and	cons,	he	suggests	that	it	is	likely	that	some	of
the	current	Private	Finance	Initiative	(PFI)	outsourcing	was	influenced	by	ideological	considerations
rather	than	being	purely	evidence-based,	and	warns	that	the	next	government	should	conduct	a
thorough	review.
Jeremy	Warner,	an	editor	at	the	Telegraph,	once	said	there	are	either	‘big	state’	people	or	‘small	state’	people.	I	felt
the	same	way	following	the	reaction	to	the	collapse	of	Carillion:	there	are	either	‘private	good,	public	bad’	people	or
‘public	good,	private	bad’	people.	Of	course,	reality	is	somewhere	in	between.
Carillion	went	bust	because	of	cost	overruns	or	delays	in	three	large	construction	projects.	The	nature	of	such
projects	involve	that	kind	of	risk,	but	clearly	the	company	–	despite	its	size	–	was	not	resilient	enough	to	withstand
those	failures.	It	did	not	go	bust	because	of	privatisation	of	public	services,	unless	you	think	the	government	should
build	its	own	hospitals	or	roads.	If	anything,	it	shows	that	those	contracting	out	public	contracts	were	getting	a	good
deal.
There	will	always	be	public	projects	contracted	out	to	the	private	sector.	Much	of	the	increase	in	public	investment
planned	by	Labour	if	it	wins	the	next	election	will	be	undertaken	by	private	firms.	Getting	the	contracting	relationship
right	is	difficult	and	fraught	with	dangers.
The	government	clearly	has	questions	to	answer	about	why	it	continued	to	award	contracts	after	the	profit	warning,
and	we	need	some	informed	analysis	to	determine	whether	the	government,	as	they	claim,	had	fully	protected	all	but
one	(!)	of	these	projects	and	will	not	lose	any	money	as	a	result	of	the	collapse.	As	David	Allen	Green	suggests,	this
smacks	of	ministerial	failure.	(The	link	also	shows	public	procurement	can	have	its	funny	side.)
Also,	why	was	the	position	of	the	‘crown	representative’	(who	was	meant	to	be	overseeing	scrutiny	of,	among	others,
Carillion)	left	vacant?	The	government	should	also	ask	whether	companies	should	be	allowed	to	pay	large	dividends
when	their	own	pension	fund	is	underfunded.	And	why	Carillion’s	auditors,	KPMG,	gave	it	a	clean	bill	of	health	when
its	balance	sheet	was	already	showing	signs	of	stress.
To	see	what	lessons	the	collapse	of	Carillion	does	have	for	the	debate	over	whether	the	public	sector	should
privatise	certain	of	its	activities	or	do	them	in	house,	we	need	to	go	through	some	of	the	pros	and	cons.
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There	is	one	main	benefit	of	contracting	out	public	services,	which	is	that	it	can	save	money.	To	mention	‘the	market’
here	is	not	very	helpful,	because	with	one	buyer	and	only	a	few	sellers	for	something	(the	contract)	agreed	once
every	few	years,	this	is	hardly	a	normal	market.	It	is	instead	about	the	incentives	faced	by	managers	and	workers,
both	in	achieving	efficiency	and	fostering	innovation.	Managers	have	a	clearer	incentive	system	in	a	private	sector
firm	to	maximise	profits,	and	that	incentive	is	provided	by	the	need	to	bid	low	to	win	the	contract	and	nevertheless
make	a	profit.	As	Carillion	shows,	margins	on	most	public	sector	outsourcing	are	not	large.	In	that	sense,	Carillion
confirms	that	part	of	this	mechanism	is	working.	A	single	public	sector	entity	cannot	replicate	this	advantage,	unless	it
too	is	in	competition	with	private	sector	firms.	In	short,	competition	improves	incentives.
One	important	qualification	to	this	argument	involves	information.	The	temptation	of	a	bidding	system	based	on	the
lowest	price	is	to	cut	quality.	So	the	public	sector	has	to	have	a	clear	means	of	not	just	specifying	quality	in	the
contract,	but	of	ensuring	the	contract	is	being	fulfilled	once	it	is	awarded.	Sometimes	politics	can	get	in	the	way	of
that	happening.	For	activities	where	quality	is	difficult	to	observe,	contracting	out	is	not	a	good	idea.
Another	qualification	involves	the	attitude	of	public	sector	workers	before	privatisation.	If	they,	for	whatever	reason,
internalise	the	need	for	efficiency	and	innovation,	because	for	example	they	can	see	how	both	improve	the	outcome
for	customers,	then	contracting	out	to	the	private	sector	will	achieve	little.	The	NHS	could	be	a	case	in	point.
A	further	problem	with	privatisation	is	finance.	When	people	argue	that	public	money	should	not	be	wasted	paying
the	shareholders	or	creditors	of	private	firms,	they	are	both	right	and	wrong.	They	are	wrong	in	the	sense	that	without
contracting	out	the	same	amount	of	money	has	to	be	raised	by	the	public	sector,	and	so	it	“wastes”	money	by	having
to	pay	interest	on	government	debt.	But	they	are	right	in	that	the	rate	of	interest	on	government	debt	is	much	less
than	the	rate	of	interest	a	private	firm	has	to	pay	on	any	debt,	or	in	the	form	of	dividends	to	shareholders.	The	reason
for	this	is	that	investors	do	not	like	risk:	people	who	lend	to	the	UK	government	know	they	will	always	get	their	money
back,	while	as	the	shareholders	and	creditors	to	Carillion	have	just	found	this	is	not	true	for	private	sector	firms.
This	is	why	Private	Finance	Initiative	(PFI)	projects	undertaken	just	so	that	the	borrowing	is	done	by	the	private
rather	than	the	public	sector	are	costly	from	an	economic	point	of	view.	It	is	why	it	makes	sense	to	exclude	public
investment	from	any	fiscal	rule:	fiscal	rules	that	restrict	public	investment	are	an	open	invitation	to	politicians	to
undertake	PFI	type	financing.	In	my	view,	the	best	constraint	on	public	investment	is	the	expected	social	return,
assessed	with	the	help	of	an	independent	body.	It	is	often	said	that	PFI	type	projects	‘avoids	risk	to	the	taxpayer’.
Again	this	is	the	wrong	way	round.	It	is	far	easier	and	cheaper	for	the	public	sector	to	take	risks	than	the	private
sector,	so	PFI	projects	are	paying	far	too	high	a	price	to	avoid	risk	to	the	public	sector.
Another	problem	related	to	risk	is	the	interrelationship	between	what	the	private	company	contracts	to	do	and	what
actually	happens	when	government	forecasts	go	wrong,	as	they	always	will.	This	may	have	happened	with	the	East
Coast	line	“bailout”	(but	if	it	was,	we	should	be	told),	and	it	did	happen	with	privatising	the	probation	service.	Public
sector	contracting	out	forces	each	side	to	commit	to	guesses	about	the	future,	whereas	if	everything	remains	in-
house	there	can	be	much	more	flexibility.	There	is	also	the	cost	of	having	to	train	more	civil	servants	in	the	art	of
writing	good	contracts.
One	further	problem	that	Carillion	reminds	us	of	is	that	privatisation	runs	the	risk	of	a	degree	of	interruption	if	the
company	goes	bankrupt.	Disruption	is	nothing	new.	If	privatisation	is	to	have	any	benefits,	the	contract	from	the
public	sector	has	to	come	up	for	renewal	every	few	years,	and	if	the	private	sector	provider	is	changed	that	will
involve	some	dislocation	of	service.
One	final	point,	which	is	contingent	on	what	I	hope	will	be	a	temporary	state	of	affairs.	Nowadays ,	the	management
overheads	for	private	sector	firms	are	likely	to	be	far	higher	than	in	the	public	sector,	for	reasons	that	have	little	to	do
with	management	quality.	Ben	Chu	sets	out	how	much	management	was	being	paid	at	Carillion	compared	to
equivalent	public	sector	managers.	And	what	on	earth	were	shareholders	doing	allowing	the	directors	to	relax
clawback	conditions	on	management’s	pay	if	things	went	wrong,	which	even	the	Institute	of	Directors	described	as
“highly	inappropriate”	and	“lacking	effective	governance”.	In	truth	the	public	sector	is	much	better	at	stopping
managers	using	their	monopoly	power	to	be	paid	over	the	odds	than	the	private	sector	appears	to	be.
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So	the	economist’s	answer	on	public	sector	outsourcing	is,	it	depends:	on	all	the	factors	outlined	above	and	probably
more	I	have	momentarily	forgotten.	(Like	economies	of	scale	and	expertise:	no	one	would	ever	suggest	the	public
sector	makes	its	own	paperclips.)	Where	the	balance	will	be	is	bound	to	be	case	dependent.	But	it	would	be
incredibly	surprising	if	at	least	some	of	the	outsourcing	undertaken	by	this	government	was	not	ideological	rather
than	evidence	based.	This	suggests	that	Labour,	if	it	wins	the	next	election,	should	undertake	a	thorough
independent	review	when	it	has	all	the	facts	at	its	disposal.	That	at	least	might	ease	fears	that	we	will	lurch	from	one
ideological	position	to	its	opposite.
______
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	the	author’s	personal	blog	and	is	being	republished	with	permission.
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